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CHAPTER 1

Ecological Narratives: Reclaiming
the Voice of Theorized Others
KLAUS KRIPPENDORFF

INTRODUCTION
.

.

.The urge to theorize has b~en a driving f(Jrce of Western intellectual tra~
clition. It underlies academic discourse, giving the scientific enterprise its
vitality. Without systematic theorizing, much of contemporary culture, particularly technology, would be virtually unthinkable.
Naturally, theorizing has not been without critics. The skeptics have raised
their voices against the ability of theory to describe anything at all. Radical
empiricists such as Francis Bacon and even some logical positivists have had
stories to tclrof the "blindness of abstraction:"
Now, postInodernists, poststructuralists, constructionists, deconstructionistS,and others are questioning the intelligibility of master riarratives and
the ability of unifying theories or of logical/mathematical systems to represent reality. From their perspective, science, literature, and law are just
three of many literary genres, each cultivatirig its own reading of texts:
The most recent critique comes from feminist scholars. Feminism is not
a unified perspective. Feminist thought has grownfar beyond its early advocacy of equal rights, by conceptualizirig patriarchal society, exploring gender differences,and contributing scathing critiqiIes of male rationality, of
technological world constructions, and of the oppressive consequences of
theory its~lf. Along its path, feminism has emphasized the embodied nature
of knowledge, for example, by accounting for voices instead of texts. Feminismadvocatedrelational epistemologies, insisted on the participation of
emotions, and discovered validation in practical actions that could lead to
personal liberation.
Narrower in scope, but no less important, is the opposition to theory by
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philosophers concerned with ethics. Dwight Furrow (1995), for instance,
influenced by a rereading of Aristotle, questions the capacity of normative
ethical theory to provide .guIdance on normative questions and challenges
its relevance to the lived experience ofmoral agents. Such critiques are fueled by a need to understand the Holocaust and all other atrocities committed since World War II by people with theories to live by.
Within literary scholarship, writers continue to reexamine their own foundations by questioning the intelligibility of texts in termS of the theorydriven distinction between meanings and an author's intentions. To them,
there is nothing in a text that could point to the difference between the two
and no method that could shed light on what this distinction creates.' For
Knapp and Michaels· (19·85·: 30);. "[Theory] is the name for all' the ways
people have tried to stand outside [the] practice [of reading and interpretation] in order to govern [that] practice from without.... [N]o one can
reach [such] a position." This leads them to propose that "the theoretical
enterprise should therefore-come·to an end."
The foregoing critiques have very different histories and little in common
withea£h other exceptfoF.theiFopposition to systematic theorizing. Often
they even oppose each other. For example, feminists have been criticized
for essentializing the very gender differences they oppose; proponents of
postmodernism, for being silent on moral questions that significantly un. dermine the intelligibility of moral experiences.
Many of these critiques rely on what I would call deficiency arguments-a
rhetorical strategy that seeks to expose the failure of a theory by showing
what it blatantly omits or surreptitiously distorts, without recognizing that
such critiques are based on another theory-usually one closer to these critics' hearts· and therefore more "real" to them. Critiques of ideology, Marxist, for example, excel in this. They argue against theories of knowledge
from a perspective tllat is assumed to be "free" or'ideological biases, more
encompassing in scope, capturing broader territory, or offering a' greater
number of distinctions;· Ye-t>;· using··one theory to criticize another remains
entirely within the practice of theorizing and cannot. therefore reveal the
blind spots of theorizing; Worse, unable to recognize these blind spots
malces theorists blind to their own blindness.
The following summarizes the social role of theory and the particular
relation that theorizing entails between theorists and the theorized others
who are in faCt the natural focus of social scientific inquiries.
.
SOMEENTMLMENTSOFTHEorozrnG
Etymologically, theory comes from the Greek theoria, the meaning of
which comprises not only the process of "looking at," "viewing," "contemplating," or "speculating" but also the very object perceived, "a sight," "a
tableau," or "a spectacle." These meanings imply a distinct attitudevis-a-
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vis wh;!t is theori;led.;Spectacles are created to be seen and discussed, not
to b.e altered. Spectacles are in front of the viewer's eye. in such accounts .
of theorizing, the use of ocular metaphors entails a tacit preference for sight
over sound, touch, and feelings; arid it assigns secondary importance to
voices, to stories, to oral traditions, and to practical knowledge. It is no
. accident that we. speak of scientific "observers," not of scientific listeners.
There is no auditory or tactile analogue to "observation," and although
reading and writi.rig would be difficult without sight, we tend to exclude
.
them when we speak of observing things.
As spectators, theorists observe but do not allow themselves to enter their
domain of observation. Consequently, theorists endow facts naively concep.tlialized as residing outside of us With the power to determine which theories
are valid. It is the belief in this ontology; if nothll.g else, that ultimately
justifies claims of being able to theorize facts for what they are, without bias
or preconceptions and without accountability to those who may be affected
by these theories.
Since the seventeenth century, science has become increasingly "successful" in disconnecting theory from facts and observation from practice, notwithstanding that etymology links "fact" to manufacture. Perhaps with the
exception of hermeneutics and constructivism, all scientific methods operationalize the derivation of theories from observational data. Aside from the
rare admission that data depend on theory, I know of no formalization of
this reverse dependency or of interactions between the tWo (seeWoolgar,
1993: 36, 53-66).
. '
Ethnographic analyses of scientific practices reveal the cherished unidirectionality in proceeding from observations to theories to bea myth (see Garfinkle, 1967; Garfinkle, Lynch, and Livingstone, 1982). But overcoming this
imidirectionalconception would seem impossible as long as theories are
stated in terms of extensional logic such as the logic of propositions or
modeled by computers, which are sequential maChines that embody the very
same logic. To preserve this unidirectionality of scientific discourse against
the threat ofvicious paradoxes, Bertrand Russell invented his famous Theory
of Logical Types, which has the effect of outlawing self-reference. It is this
restricted notion of logic and of language that places scientific observers at
the top of logical hierarchies, that conceptualizes description top.downwards, and' that leads theorists to believe they could observe their
world With01~t beirig observed by the objects of their observation.
.The ocular metaphor is so prevaienr within the scientific community that
theorists are encouraged to keep their distance not just to the observed but
to their theories as well. A case in point is the distinction between theory
and belief. In scientific texts, theories appear as more Or less confirmed hypotheses:--:-each having a calculable probability, however small, of being invalid.. Not so for beliefs. When we theorize, we do so about something.
When we believe, we do so in something. In beliefs, the emotional detach-
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ment that theorists claim to have vis-a-vis their theories is erased in favor of
the virtual certainty that things are the way they are seen and spoken of For
Sbiiiley Fish~(T98S;' l'I6):
A theory is a special achievement of consciousness; a belief is a prerequisite of being
conscious at'all. Beliefs are not what you think about but what you think with. ... '
[I]t is within the space provided by their articulations that mental activity-including
the activity of theorizing-goes on. Theories are something you can have-you can
wield them and hold them at a distance; beliefs have you, in the sense that there can
be rio distance between them and the acts they enable.

The truths ot theot:ies~may be pondered, but the truths of beliefs are held. '
Contrary to popular conceptions of theories as very accurate represema'tions, theories are attractive because they can exceed their dOmain of observation in at least five ways: (1) Theories generalize to cases claimed to be
sinlllar. to thGse obseFVed. Yet, without further observations, no assurance is
available that the unobserved cases would support a theory's claim.
Therefore, their.,gener.alizations rely on a good deal of belief. (2) Theories
also predict under the assumption that the patterns observed in the past will
persist into the future. Beliefs in such continuities have much practical value,
but, as Francis Bacon already noted, they are ascertainable only in retrospect.
(3JThearies"also i1#egrateseveral propositions into a single coherent network and (4) generate empirical hypotheses from very few quasi-axiomatic
propositions. (3) and (4) are predicated on the belief that the logic ofprope
ositions corresponds to the logic of the world. For Carl Hempel (Mitchell,
•1985: 7), moreover, (5) theory tends to be talcen as "a complex spanal
network [that] floats, as it were; above the plane of observation arid is anchored to it by rules of interpretation." Yet rules of interpretation always
are the rules of a theorist or of a community of theorists, not Of an observed
nat:ute. They allow theorists to justifY omitting details deemed irrelevant,
accidental, uniql:l~'i~in€oflsist(mt, or.,subjc€tiv<t;.Fillmg"i,n.. the"gaps of missed
observations; and smoothing the rugged curves-none of which are deriv~
able from observation and measurement., Politically, the more territory a theory covers, the more it is preferred,the
better it will be remembered, the more likelytha,t it will be applied. Thus,
theorizing supports a conceptual imperialism-the Urge to oversee; predict, ,
control, and govern ever-expanding territories (Krippendorff, 1993)-an
inkling that science"sftilres with other forms'of government in national, spiritual, or commercial spheres of life. True, by themselves, theories neither
reign nor rule. Once institutionalized, however, they do empower their users
to "survey," "capture," "represent," "monitor," and ultimately "manage"
if not "discipline" what they claim to describe. The underlying logic of
propositions, and in particular its Theory of Logical Types, favors the construction of logical hierarchies of ever-increasing levels of abstractions, from

'ECOLOGICAL NARRATIVES

objects to language to metalanguage to meta-metalanguage, and so forth,
with theorists being comfortable only at the top.
Foucault's (1977) metaphorical use of the panopticon, tCi show how
knowledge works in society, is telling. The panopticon is an ideal prison
design that enables centrally located guards to monitor the behavior of all
inmates, who in turn 'can see only the guards observing them but not each
other. Here discipline is assured by the efficiency of observation: In taking
this design as a metaphor to explore power relations in society, Foucault
equates knowledge and theory and carries the built-in ocularity to its ultimate socio-Iogical conclusion: the government of one view at the expense
ofall others (see Holsti, this volume).
Theories are 'also expected to be rational and consistent, ideally in the
form of mathematical expressions,as systems of equations, for example. Formalizations of this kind have the double advantage of being computable in
principle and of sparing one the complicatiqns of context and meaning.
Mathematical theories provide the backbone of the natural sciences but have
made inroads also in efforts to explain social and political phenomena, in
economics, linguistics, psychology',' and systems science, for instance. While
rationality and consistency are seen as twin values in scientific explorations,
they also provide two different aspects of themonologism that theory implies. Being "rational" is tantamount to expressing oneself in the voice of
one's community, a voice that is assumed common to all of its members
and sanctioned as such. Rationality defers one's own voice to a fictional
authority. Beirig "consistent," on the other hand, is tantanlount to avoiding
contradictions among the propositions of a theory. Consistency entails the
, belief that a single overarching logiccoulcl govern the phenomena a theory'
, claims to be abo\lt. The requirement that theories be both rational and
consistent thus reduces them to monological constructions'in the dual sense
of being the product of a single voice and of being cast in terms ,of one
(coherent) logic. This has considerable implications for both social theorizing and theory building in international relations.

, THE LANGUAGING OF THEORIES
Consider the following rather typical propositio~s, which could be found
in any social sCience writing:
(a) Institutions have four functions,
(b) Nationalism is an outgrowth of modernism.
(c) Terrorism is caused by a breakdown in political structures.
(d) Unemployment feeds crime.

In the context of the foregoing, these four propositions should betroubIesome: None of them indicates whose truths they state, attesting to their
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complete disembodiment. All hide that they are fundamentally about what
people do. Institutions, nationalism, terrorism, unemployment, and crime
" do rtdt exist without their performers. Yet their voices are silenced in each
of these generalizations. There is no indication of how their behaviors end
up being so categorized. Even the voice of the theorist remains, perhaps
deliberately, hidden in objectivist parlance. Language is implicated here in
even more fundamental ways, however: Of the four propositions, (a) asserts
that a concept "has" or is "in possession of" properties, which lends an
almost physical existence to this concept, to institutions as it were. Proposition (b) applies an agriCultural metaphor to tWo rather high~leve1 abstractions from a complex nexus of human behaviors without referring to any
par:dc.ular group of people or locale-:-even though metaphors reside in language, not in nature. Proposition (c) claims two abstractions, a category of
human behavior and a stable pattern abstracted from a process; to be causally
related. How could that be? And (d) accounts for what is likely a statistical
-correlation between two variables in terms -of nutrition~one being an agent,
the other its target~ A casual reading of these propositions gives the impression that they state facts. However, such a reading overlooks .their meta-'
phorical' nature. Ho~ could concepts cause anything analogous to how
billiard balls bounce against each other? How could measurement variables
act or interact? In what sense could nonmaterial structures break? The failure
.. to recognize the metaphorical nature of language even in our most rigorous
scientific discourses attests to remarkable unawareness of how language di~
reets the world that we theorize.
Theories are formed in language, but they must be languaged into being
in a manner to be fit to survive in processes of human communication. In
the: context of their communicatiori, the notion of theory suffers from two
illusions:
(1) The first stems from the belief that the form of theory could be separated from what language malces available and that, by the same token,
human communication -has no influence on how and where theories come
into beirig. Theories are not merely found. They are constructed, proposed,
promoted, published, discussed, and either adopted or rejected. Their reality
lies in stating them (see also Mansbach, in this volume); in understanding
them as such, and iri enacting them into actual practices. These are the acts
of real people, actors who see some virtue in promulgating what they speak
of. It follows that theorizing cannot be understood from a notiori that language is a neutral medium of representation (as formalized in propositional
logic) nor from the corollary that theories may be justifiable solely by observations (of objects outside language). The notion oflanguaging asa dialogical process permits us to recognize theories as mediating between their
stakeholders, as residing in processes of communication (as in Pirages, this
volume). From this perspecti\re, theories cannot be found in the contents
of statements nor inside individual minds b1,lt in processes of theircontin-
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uous rearticulations. Theories that fail to compel people to reproduce and
recirculate them within their community simply fade away.
"
/\5 cOrpinu.n:ication~,theoriesserve various social functions. They can" dea theorist's identity. They can form the basis of particular research pro~
grams or schools of thought. They can also become institutionalized in
"disciplines that require adherence to or belief in them from its practitioners.
,·,Linguists, biologistsvpsychologists, all academic disciplines, distinguish
themselves by the theories they believe in. Sometimes, theories may take the
form of abstract paradigms that privilege particular scientific explorations.
At other times, they certifY practitioners and protect them against criticisms
from other disciplines. In either case, theories are political phenomena.
(2) The second illusion arises from the conviction that social theories have "
invariant and single meanings. Unlike natural scientific theories, social theories, mice published, can reenter" and touch the lives of the very people
about whom they speak (Krippendorff, 1996). When such a reentry occurs,
theories and those theorized in them begin to interact arid modifY each
other in ways that violate the idea of theory as a descriptive account of stable
facts, as a representation of an unintelligent world. Those who find" themselves theorized might use this publicity as a \Yay to enhance their status or "
perceive such as a threat to their very identity. When known, a theory can
affect the behavior of the theorized by either strengthening or invalidating
it: Black Power and feminist movements, for example, effectively countered
prevailing theories about them by theories of "their own. Theories may also"
"be adopted by people who discover new meaniIlgs by way of living through
their propositions, acting out their stereotypes, preserving their distinctions,
and making them truer thereby. The mass media, by catering to audiences
"who are conceptualized in terrris of their size and attractiveness," "mainstream" the public, causing more people to become similar to each other
and thus enhancing their attractiveness to advertisers. Taldng theories, especially predictive ones, as prescriptions for action can turn them into selffulfilling prophecies. In"social reality; which depends on the knowledge that
people have of it, this is typical," not exceptional. Thus, theories of social
phenomena do not merely represent; they alsotrtinsform their objects in"
the proceSs of their communication. Positivists have reasons to worry that"
the reentry of theories into their domain" df observation could well undermine "their validitY: They take considerable" methodological "precautions to
protect their ontology from such challenges. But if theorizing is a political
process and if the dissemination of social theories does change their validity,
onerriight think that political science would have much to say about the
politics of theorizing and that the theories created in the social sciences
would at least account for their own social consequences. This, however,
seems not to be the case.
Inspired by the triumphs of the natural sciences, convinced that the social
sciences, too, could discover and accumulate a body of theories, social the-

me
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orists have effectively succeeded in rendering social theOly "unsocial," political theory "apolitical," and so forth. The widespread practice of
theorizIng t1ie social (see Holsti and Mansbach, this volume) conceals its
corilmunicativt: and political nature.
Theorizing the social seems to work only where theorists,the institutions
,using their theories, and the theorized others collude, if only by holding the
theorized reality constant while collectively denying that they had anything
to do with it. This grand self-deception correlates wellwith the myth that
theorists could stay outside of the language that they use in explaining the
world as inhabited by people without linguistic intelligence of their own and
taldng a "God's eye view" (Putnam, 1981) of the universe; Scholars who
hav.e.,dared to question such monological practices have been seriously sanctioned. This has happened to several philosophers of science':""-including
Popper, Lakatos, and Kuhn-among whom physicists chose to single out
the late Paul Feyerabend as "The Worst Enemy of Science" (Horgan,
1993)..
h would seem that the foregl?ing offers us a choice. We can continue
,.practicing natum..science methods when theorizing our' domairl of obserc
vation; ~de' behind an objectivist language,' and lose touch with the social
world that we unwittingly transform. Or we can deliberately and responsibly
involve ourselves in the very politics that our inquiries set in motion. To
'uncfe'iscore the urgency of this choice, let me explore how fellow humans
fare in theories about them, as Ihave done elsewhere (Ciprut, 2000), before
'
submitting a proposal for an alternative theoretical path.'

THEORIZING THE ,OTHER
(,1) Theorizing Gives Birth to Distant Otherness. As generalizations, theories classify observations and theorize people in terms of third-person plural.
"They" are the subjects of experiments, the interviewees of surveys, and the
respondents. to mail. questionnaires. "They'·' are the observed, the conser- ..
vatives, the unemployed, the Catholics, and the terrorists. All of "them" are
labeled and assigned to particular classes on account of characteristics that
all members of such classes are assumed to share. Classification begins at the
data-generating stage of social research. In interviewing, neither the identity
, of the interviewee nor that of the interviewer becomes data. For fear of
biasing the data, personal knowledge, which could emerge when experimenters come too close to their subjects, iS'repressed systematically. In the theater, spectators would have no problems distinguishing between actors
and the characters that they play oli stage. In social research; individuals are
the velY categories that a theory provides for them. Where individuals do
identify with a group, belief, or trait, theorists are not prohibited from dismissing such' declarations as subjective, lacking abstraction, or irrelevant to
their theory. When quoted, individual voices are taken to exemplify the voice
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of a class. This is achieved when a polyphony (a multitude of voices) is
channeled into a single synthesized voice-one for each class or category of
the theorist's choosing.
Classes never speak, however; only individuals do, albeit always to others,
even when they are virtual. In the reality of everyday life, collective monologues, choruses, for example, are extremely rare. To take such exceptions
,··as a·norm fbrsocial scientific insightsis to avow the artificial unsocial nature
of theorizing.
In everyday languaging, third-person pronouns refer to those absent. Theorizing makes this absence a virtue that bestows on theorists the freedom
to characterize others in ways radically different (and inferior) to themselves.
Whether one calls .this a professional disability (a deafuess to individual
voices or an institutionalized disrespect for otherness), theorizing ends up
being responsible for estranging others from ourselves.
(2) Theorizing Trivializes Others by Reducing Them to Obedient Mechanisms. As spectators, when social theorists observe human behaviors, including verbal interactions, they do so from outside the spectacle. From this
perspective, behaviors appear as linear sequences, temporally ordered chains
of events, or trajectories in a Cartesian space within predefined coordinates.
To understand trajectories, natural scientists seek to discover their patterned
regularities. Here, talk of "regularities" assumes that these are followed
without choice in the matter; talk of their "discovery,"that they existed
prior to observation and measurement. Note that such assumptions arenot
orily built into mathematical theories of behavior and inscribed into computationaltechniques for analysis of behavioral data-they can also penetrate
less formalized talk of social causation. For example, plays are usually
scripted, and scripts explain much of what theater audiences end up seeing.
For the strict determinacy of machines, scripts are to performances much as
computer programs are to computations, however. They are in control of
the plot. Thus, describing human behavior in terms of scripts, rules, and
grammars, even as reactions to messages, conjures the determinism of obedient mechanisms. Since spectators can never be sure of whether, when, and
to what extent an observed behavior is minutely scripted, responses to unobserved conditions or improvised or deterministic accounts have no observational basis. They are a matter of preferences-unless theorists step out of
their observer's role to ask pertinent questions. However, even the Turing
Test, designed to distinguish machine from human intelligence, is never
quite conclusive. Its use has taught us that interaction is a necessary but not
sufficient condition to determine the presence of human intelligence or
agency. Yet theorists cannot afford this interaction since it would shift the
authority for theorizing to the subjects being observed and thus erode the
theorists' objective observer status.
. Thus, theorizing remains stuck in causal and mechanistic explanations of
human behavior, from which that of the theorists is excluded. Without en-
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gaging theorized others in conversations on the theories being developed
about them, social theorists are remarkably free to explore any theory that
would 'be ofinterest to their community. Although novel conceptualizations
may not come easy, froni the convenient position of an outside observer it
is quite all right for sociologists like Goffman (1959, 1963) to describe social
interactions in dramaturgical categories; and fOf psychologists like Schank
arid Abelson (1977) to interpret a same behavior in terms of individuals
following rules and scripts; for literary scholars like Hirsch (1967) to extract
intentions from authors' writings; for cognitive scientists to developalgorithms that are presumed to govern individuals' processing and exchange of
information; or for economists and political scientists to measure the efficacy
with which "actors apply ':tvailable,,resources: Without consulting the constit,
uents of the social phenomenon of interest, almost anything goes.
(3) Theorizing Inscribes Its Monologism into Its Observational Data and
Creates the Very Unsocial Conditions in Which Th,eories Can Survive. Atmo'menu of contad between the theorist and the theorized, scicialresearch
invariably depends on collaboration and" dialogue. Only by informed consent
'inay hUinan su15jects' be used ill scientific experiments. Yet after signing their
consent, form, their ability to understand the nature of their involvement
and to say no to practices they might corisider unconscionable is rarely ever
call(;d,upon,a:gain,YoG0es"Rot, ~Rtel'til(!"dai:a, 'and has therefore litcle' chance
to inform a theory that speaks to these subjects' capabilities. In order to
uphold the notion that theory is" responsi\'e to observations orily, the dialogical nature of the actual contact must be hidden,and the collaboration
needed to conclude an experiment, concealed,
Or consider interviewing. In this asymmetrical interaction, the interviewer
asks questions, and the interviewee is expected to answer them. Interviewees
are allowed to speak" only within the narrow confines of what is relevant. In
effect, interviewees are being used to support the point that researchers intend to malcc:;, and wthe cours.e,.ofthis"exploir.ation, the asymm~tr.icaLpQwer",,,
relations are necessarily and irretrievably inscribed in the data on which theories are constructed.
The deception of informants as to the main purpose of their participation
in a research project, the myriad questions that are irrelevant to interviewees'
lives, the contrived stimulus conditions to which subjects are asked to respond-all affirm the essential asymmetry, artificiality; and unsocial conditions that spawn the data for social and'psychological theories, "(ltesepoi'er
relations creep into the data-making process in obvious violation of the idea"
of theory as observer-independent; Yes, theorizing" does subject its subjects .
It renders them serviceable (Sampson, 1993) to theories that end tip dem~
onstrating lii:tle more than how well theorists have managed" to dis.able the
social nature of human beings. True, submitting to authorities, following
instructions is part of what we can do. But replicating" such undesirable
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human conditions, at the expense of human agency, for the mere sa.ke of
theorizing, amounts to political suicide for the social sciences.
(4) Theorizing Nurtures a Culture of Blittdness to the Political Nature of
Theory-for Theorist and Theorized Alike. The social sciences are concerned
with the ways that human beings can live together (see Teune and Mlinar,
this volume); sociology, with how people organize themselves into larger
wholes"'and coordinate their actions in"ways that sustain these wholes (see
Pirages's chapter, this volume); political science, with how people create
publics, arrive at some consensus on agendas, and mandate their leaders to
form governments (see Lipschutz's chapter, this volume); international relations, with how the peoples of the world perceive, and deal with, each
other across national boundaries (see Buzan's chapter, this volume), resolve
international conflicts (see Zartman's chapter,this volume), and regulate the
innumerable'interactions between the diverse constituencies ofnation-states;
and communication research, with how people construct, sustain, and transform their social universe by communicating with each other.
But none of these social phenomena can be understood by straightjacketing people into mechanistic conceptions and removing from them the
spaces in which they interact with one another. The celebration of theory,
, the use of ocular metaphors for knowing, the reliance on extensional logic,
and the naturalness with which people accept confinements during datamiling processes all have become part of a culture that suppresses the aware, ness, of the political nature of theories-not only for theorists but'also 'for
all those who see each other in these terms. The very culture of theorizing
malces it difficult for the social sciences to reflect on its social nature.
This self-defeating consequence of theorizing in the social sciences is not
recognizable from within a representational sense or notion of language that
philosophers such as L.J.]. Wittgenstein, R. Rorty, M. M. Balchtin, J. C.
Austin, and J. R. Searle have so systematically challenged in preference to
less abstract and dialogical conceptions. Their critiques center largely on the
fact that words are actions, too, and that languaging accomplishes things
beyond describing them. Reentry adds a cybernetic spin to their critique,
showing that languaging is recursive. Where language informs action, theories are likely to become self~validating. Under these conditions, our generalizations of others, whether published as scientific papers, in journals, or
disseminated in the mass media, provide fertile ground for social prejudices
to arise and to become truths that can easily subordinate, discipline, marginalize, and criminalize others for their otherness.
It, is always possible to contest and reject a claim. But in view of the
authority that scientific theories do conjure in our culture, contesting them
would go against a whole complex of deep-rooted cultural beliefs-among
them, that theories have' but one legitimate interpretation and that theories
are shaped by observations, not by theorists. The latter belief leaves no real
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target for challenges; the former makes political considerations seem irrelevant.
Whenever scientific accounts concern specific populations-be they the
homeless, women, homosexuals, African Americans, Arabs, Catholics, con-·
sumers, Or teachers-they can achieve two things: In the immediate, they
can entice "us" to treat "them" in the very categories that these accounts
employ. In the long run, this treatment can transfOrm "them" into the
homogenous groups that we claim "they" are. Self-validation, or reification,
is typical in the social sciences. As Giddens (1984) observed, has not the
mere metaphorical use of the term market in the academic. writings of the
nineteenth century about economic activities ended up materializing that
realit)'" in ways that, today, neither economists nor chief executive officers
would dare to question? Has not our conception of "the public" shifted
from what was discussed in salons and side-street cafes to what scholars
theorized as public opinion and then encouraged polls to measure? Has not
· the use of hydraulic and archeological metaphors in Freud's writing of the
human psyche produced a whole industrY of psychotherapists and clients for
all ofwhom mental disorders have become as real as they can be? And have
not the theories of consumer behavior and of mass media consumption, so
avidly embraced by advertising agencies, brought forth the very consumer· ism that these theories needed in order to survive-by creating precisely the
passive audiences that theories of mass communication are so good at describing? Do not correlations reported between intelligence, ethnicity, and
crime, together with genetic explanation, inform our educational poli'cies
.and hiring practices that keep such correlations real, well beyond published
data? Do not statistics of cultural, racial, sexual, and· national population
characteristics inform and reify the very distinctions that statisticians initially
build into their survey instruments and then naively "discover"? Is it then
not likely that theories, which cannot but describe human nature in mech· anistic terms, help create the very cultural dupes that television requires,
abet the very behaviors that enable institutions to persist, discourage people
from contesting scientific theories about them, and create obedient citizens
who might differ as to whom they vote for but not as to how they could
be influenced?
This is the reality we face. I am not suggesting that the project of the
· social sciences is doomed. I am submitting that if theorizing does continue
to dominate our understanding of other human beings, it unwittingly installs an intellectual imperialism in our social world that silences the voices
of the theorized, that prevents us from engaging in meaningful conversations with those who constitute the social phenomena we wish to understand, and that risks depriving us therefore of our primary source for
understanding how social phenomena come to be~
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A PROPOSAL FOR ECOLOGICAL NARRATIVES
_Much of scientific theorizing, it must be emphasized, is manifested not
in talk but in writing. Many of the entailments of theorizing that I have
sketched may not be entirely attitudinal or epistemological but traceable to
what the medium of writing makes (un)available to the theorist. In writing
this chapter, I, too, feel the-puU of mon'ologism: After all, I am conceiving
of social phenomena in the absence of those I am writing about. I, too,
stand to be accused of theorizing about theorizing. But after considerable
_deliberations, what I am proposing here is a form of writing that might
circumvent the old practice. I am calling it an ecological narrative, a manner
ofwriting a story ofsocial phenomena that embraces the stories ofits human
constituents and in so doing can be reembodied in their .lives.
An ecologyofdiverse plants and animals, human populations explicidy
included, can be said to arise in the interactions among its many constituents
who, by distinguishing among kinds of interactions, organize themselves
into families, cultures, and speCies and enact their own local and positional
understandings ofthCir worlds (Pirages's, Teune and Mlinar's, Zartman's,
Buzan's, and Lipschutz's chapters, each in its own way, deal with ecology).
An ecology isalways more encompassing than the world of my of its constituents. Hence, ani ecology is neither wholly theorizable (comprehensible)
from anyone position within: that ecology nor fully exploitable (controllable) by anyone of its species, all possible dominance relations (see_Buzan.,~
. this voJuine) among them notwithstanding.
By stark analogy, a narrative can be said to arise in the -stories told orwritten in the expectation of being understood and rearticulable by active
listeners or readers-constItuents of that narrative-who, by sharing certain
stories and not others, especially of themselves, form numerous narrative
communities. Their individual members understand these stories as giving
meaning to their lives within these communities. Narratives are always incomplete. They cannot carry their -full history _into -the present, -and -they
preserve the possibility of being extendable by rearticulation, commentary,
recomposition, or the addition of other, heretofore unheard, voices.
. For a start, one could liken an ecological narrative to the written records
of a conversation whose readers call distingUish between several voices respondingto eachother, can understand what is going on in the exchanges,
and could carry the process onward-ideally by feeling invited to join the
conversation as participants and to prolong the ongoing process in real time.
Like ecologies, conversations are not manageable by anyone party and -the
interpretation of what is said cannot be expected to be the same for each
participant. They are hot theorizable from any single position. Consensus
can neither be expected nor demanded. Conceptual diversity and confllct.$,
even struggles over correct interpretation-over conceptions of the whole,
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for example-are constitutive of the multiple and ever-emerging conversationalrealities, precisely because these conceptions live in processes of com, 'munication. Should alien conceptions, theories, for example, enter from
"outside a coiwersation, their viability w:ould depend on nothing simpler than
being rearticulableand meaningful to its constituents. Ecological narratives
have to foster such readings.,
"
An ecological narrative is not social, political, or international because it
represents social, political, or international phenomena (as theorists must
claim for their theories) but rather because its distinctions are an acknowledged part of what is being narrated, enacted, and hence experienced by its
participants. Such a narrative cannot be modeled on or emulate amecha'nistie,organismic, or mentalistic system. Instead, it may be understood in
terms of a dialogical concept of language-':-narriely, through languaging or
conversa:tion~

, , An ecological ~1arrative mitigates natural tensions between social and in'dividual·explanations. On the one hand, social realities' are brought forth in
dialogue, in interactions that involve lariguage, which is asocial phenome',' nOFl·as, well; and on the other hand, such realities constitutively depend. on
and are informed by the conceptual, narrative, and conversational skills and
abilities of its individual constituents. What does this mean fot writing sOcial
science? I state my proposal in six points:
' ,,'
First, to narrate ecologically means to recognize that observational ac'co.untsdo not exist without their narrators. ObserVations are made by
ob,servers. Narratives are made by narrators capable of being observers as
welLAnd this entails a particular standpoint or perspective from which each
speaks. Positionless accounts divert the attenti()li of their readers away from
the narrator, as the source of such accounts, to contents outside of the
process of giving accounts to each other. It is the latent consequences of
positionless rhetoric that renders scientific discourse so troublilig. To overcome this rhetoric, lam recommending that we, social scientists, actively
assert our respon:sibilities for what we \vrite-for example, by adopting the
first-person pronouns "I," or "we"; by using verbs that elucidate our active
,involvement;, by assuring our readers that the' path we happen to be talcing ,
need not be theirs; and by explicitly acknowledging that our narrative con,structions niight affect unknown or unintended others as welL In ecological
accounts, since even theories should be regarded as someone)s theories, they
should be considered to lead to manifold interpretations, scientific insistence
on single readings aside. Not least, ecological narratives have to' acknowledge
explicitly their positional and polysemous nature.
Second, in ecological narratives, we must grant others their voices as well.
We need to let the constituents of social phenomena speak for themselves,
of themselves, from positions of their own choice and in situations ill which
they can feel comfortable and at home. Listening to what people want to
say arid taking theirnarratives seriousiy open us up to worlds otherwise

'ECOLOGICAL'NARRATIVES

15

unthinkable, even when uncomfortable or troublesome at times. Ecological
narratives must acknowledge the agency of others and the spaces that they
have created in order to move about and to take standpoints different from
ours. Otherness is our most important challenge (see Zartman and complement with Holsti's, Buzan's, and Mansbach's chapters, this volume).
Reporting the stories of those whose worlds we wish to learn to understand--isodone ·by several resea~ch traditions, especially ethnography. But unfortunately, even ethnography has acquired the flavor of being applicable to
ordinary folks only. Their method does not prevent (the often anthropological) ethnographers from floating above their informers, much as theorists
seek to stay above their facts. The voice of the ethnographer should be
considered neither uncontestable nor superior to ethnographical research.
·This does not speak against abstractions. Politicians do n6tshy away from
conceptualizing their political realities in abstract, positionless, and often
stereotypical terms. Since an objectivist rhetoric can provide power and in•fluence to its users, its use is likely to continue. Rather, by always acknowledging the source of· such abstractions, ecological narratives will .not
capitalize on this rhetoric. Those who use them-politicians but also certain
analysts who interpret political speeches and analyze political climates, structures, or events of which politicians speak-merely add their voices to political processes, voiCes that. should not be talcen more seriously than those
of other participants. Often, the voices of social scientists, as important as
they maybe inthe social scientific literatUre, might mean nothing-to those
directly engaged in the events being written of, Thus, merely reporting on
what others say or do,' assembling a kaleidoscope of parallel ethnographies,
record1ng a polyphony of sorts, .writing a polyphonic novel-as Balchtin
·would say-is simply not enough.
Third, I suggest, therefore~ that ecological narratives try not to talce the
stories that they record at face value. Everything said or written' (a) should
be qualified in terms of how their readers or listeners respond to it and (b)
should be approached with as few theoretical presuppositions as possible. The
first part of this recommendation is not entirely new but rarely heeded. It
talces seriously Balchtin's notion (see Todorov, 1988: 41-60) that any utterance implies at least tw~ voices, that of the speaker and that of the addressee. The meaning of an utterance-the speech act it performs, for
example, or the 'sense it malces to someone-:-critically depends on the relation between what we hear a speaker say and how we observe its listeners
respond (see Holquist, 1990). What we hear being said, the stories we read
and quote, should not be considered "inherently" meaningful, as "containing" meanings or "conveying" its author's "intentions," even when they
mean something definite to us. For "containing," "conveying," and "intending" invoke metaphors that objectifY meanings as entities and seemingly
dispense with the need for our reading: Semiotics has largely followed this
line of theorizing. But, in ecological narratives, we must refrain from vying
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to be the sole authority on meanings, on others' understaridings. We must
. instead find ways of listening to howothers take what we may hear differ".. ently, to how they respond in ways we would not. This calls on us to locate
meanings in the responses and rearticulations that they trigger, irithe relations between writers and readers or between speakers and listeners. For we,
too, assume merely one of these positions. Only in the last instance would
nieaningbe our interpretation-but not forever, because the narratives that
result from ours are as important as the narratives that we incorporate in
our own. To narrate ecologically means to curb the self-arrogating assumption of our being the only reader/interpreter/respondent of note. To show
what something means is to embed it~ where possible, within the networks
oHts:responsive (re)articulations.
In scholarly writing, to be sure, we do quote our sources, often extensively, but mostly in support of the point we hope to malee. By contrast, in
an ecological narrati,re, we must resist censoring the voices of others: This
- calls for 'our not dismissing the stories we hear being told-unless they are
dismissed within the conversations froIll which they stem. It calls for avoiding- the-temptation· of· presuming to know. what others "really'" intend:even without consulting them. In particular, this calls for renouncing our
self-celebratory "hermeneutics of suspicion," which elevate us to a position
()f kn6~ng what we deny others to be aware of-hegemony, for example, .
or our systematic doubt in the sincerity of others, or conspiracy theory, for
instance,
unless "hegemony" or "deception" occurs. in. the conversation we
.
are attempting to enter. In this regard; terrorism provides a good example.
Terrorists tend to hold well-worked-out constructions of reality that make
their actions meaningful to them. It is our own norrriative theory of how
all good citizens should behave that justifies our dismissal of their world as
a distortion of reality, a reality whose self-serving construction we fail to
acknowledge as such. In this (our own) reality, our actions tend to drive
uncomfortable-others from being mere deviants to becoming active dissenters' or terrorists; to' fall into the vely categories that we may feitrarid"to
which we require that disabling punishments apply. In effect, fighting terror
preserves a world without need to. grant spaces for alternative realities to
coexist.
.
In order to minimize the constraints of theoretical presuppositions, our
approach to ecological narratives should be as naive as possibie, offering a
deliberately open mind, from a position of "not knowing," as the therapist
Harlene Anderson (1997) recommends-this, in order to overcome the
ever-present temptation of projecting our own theory onto others and, instead, to talee in and to echo what others tell us,including who they are.
True, this could well malte ecological narratives more complex (and possibly
less elegant) than the more current monological theories or the extant un.digested collections of individual ethnographies. But public policy decisions,
international events, political debates, social problems, and even family
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happenings-when seen through such narrative networks-are rarely more
complex than the stories that their constituents can· tell of these -events,
of each other's stories of these events, and of their responses to them,
Whereas ethnographers assemble individual stories, ecological narrators will
have to weave them (back) into social fabrics, as the examples further below
may demonstrate.
·'·"Fourth;-1nasmuch as social','ealities do arise in. the co-enactment of the
understandings that participants have of their worlds, of themselves, and of
each other in them, understanding the worlds that others occupy and how
they define themselves in relation to one another is key to understanding
the dynamics that unfold in the interactions across these worlds. In ecological
narratives, what would matter most is how the various constituents of a
social phenomenon perceive each other's stance, capabilities, intentions,
Views, and probable responses to\.vhaf'fiappens or is being said. In classical
systems theory, it is the theorist who specifies the relations between the
components of a system before attending to their consequences. Systems
theory, like all theories, mal<;:es no room for human agency. It does not
provide options among which the "components"· of a system may select
their system's conceptions. It leaves no spaces for the hurnanconstituents
of social systems to act on the awareness of each otht;r's choices. Game
theory would have come dose to such an awareness, were it not theorized
from outside of the players. The game theorist assumes that all players face
each other in a shared world of payoffs,a world that is of the.theorist'sown
construction. In contrast, narrating ecologically means a priori respect for
the potentially unlike worlds of those who language each other into being;
who give each other accounts of the paths they are pursuing; who i;oordinate
their stories; and who thus find themselves codirecting a social dynamics
from inside the process being narrated by them, Ecological narratives require
and therefore must esteem the agency· of their narrators. Conceding the
necessary openness of narratives, ecological narrators have to make some
effort. to .extend the network of recorded stories by articulating their possible
continuations, ideally in ways that would make sense to' those being narrated
in them.
I suppose one might slip here into speaking of predictions. But this is
precisely what would deriy those narrated their agency and dismiss the possibility of their accepting or contesting the narratives of concern to them.
An ecological narrative would not assign agency to abstractions, to systems,
for example, or to the physical environment, but would presume its narrators' ability to act on their understanding of what they see, of each other's
stories and of each other's understandings of these stories. Respectful communication requires such a recursively embedded understanding.Mechanistic explanations unable to acknowledge this understanding may indeed arise
in narratives, although not from the ecological narrators for whom such an
understanding is wholly constitutive.
-
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Fifth, as all other participants in a dialogue, ecological narrators· have to
live with the humbling experience that social realities are profoundly unpre"'dictaJjle, that all accounts of them therefore must remain open-ended, incomplete, and constitutively incoherent much of the time. This. may prove
disturbing for outside observers who must struggle with great numbers of
seemingly contradictory accounts that may malce a lot of sense froin within
and also with generalizations that appear arbitrary and shallowfrom without.
In everyday life, people communicate with each other selectively, creating
parallel conversational realities. Taken together, these realities form loosely
connected "multi-versa" that supplant the construction of a singular and
coherent system or "uni-verse." . The.purported globalizing effects of mass media technologies are far from
converging toward a unified world. Their reality is complex, multifaceted,
fractionalized, tentative, and continually reconstnicted and maintained. Narrators cannot be in these multiversa all at once. Even a simple construction
. such ·as terrorism, sweeping and judgmental. as it may be, survives only in
particular networks of told stories~for example, the network o(manifestos
issuedhy revolutionaries seeking to change the world; of stories told by the
members of an establishment facing an unexpected wave of disrespect or of
. violence from a previously unknown group; of police reports generated by
officers trying to fulfill their duty in apprehending criminals; of narratives by
VIctims and by their grieving families; of speeches by politicians seeking to
cash in on an instance of public uncertainty; or of accounts that TV viewers .
and newspaper readers obtain by attending to the news. Each acknowledges,
or connects to, some ofthe other stories, and all compete fonittention in
a public space within which terrorism isdefiiled, politicized, even as it thrives
and eventually recedes into history. This offers the ecological narrator much
to work from. Readers of such narratives may have to tolerate at least as
much diversity, inconsistency, and contradiction as is evident in the multiversity.ofthe intelwoven worlds being narrated. One can hardly start from
the assumption that the worlds, which such stories bring forth, are either
similar or complementary to one another. Yet it is the very discrepancies
and discontinuities of these worlds that enable their nal'rators to extrapolate
a dynamic of what might happen, should these narratives come in contact.
Stories evolve in the very dynamics they individually inform. And in these
. .
.
.
interactions, stories rarely ever stay the same.
.As dialogical accounts, ecological narratives cannot but be incomplete:
(1) They present no more than one discursive· moment in the process of
their contiriual rearticulation. (2) EffortS to embrace the narratives of all of
its constituents can be at best fair, at worst illusory,but al~ayscontestable
by anyone present. (3) And the telling (communication) of these narratives
can be responsive to only some of the many voices that, together;iJiform.
their multilogical self-producing future. .
.
And sixth, if polincs means acting in the belief ofki1owing others'inten- .
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tions, being cognizant of the history of one's individual participation in the
political· process, remaining mindful of how one's own languaging might
enable, constrain,or (re)organize the public lives of others including one's
own, then a social science that recognizes its own politics offers two ways of
understanding its phenomena.
The first way is more in line with our established scholarly tradition. I like
. . to:see it as a mere step toward the second. It involves sitting back and .
analyzing the network of narratives heard, then extrapolating from· them all
conceivable continuations without· getting personally involved. This is what
journalists claim they do when reporting an event through the stories of its
participants, witnesses, and stakeholders. This is also what most political
activists do when discussffig requisite strategies with their advisers before
going public.
The second, largely neglected way of understanding becomes evident in
one's active participation and discursive intervention in the social processes of
concern. This is achieved by tuning narratives and actions to their possible
effects; inviting others to voice their concerns, even to comment on each
other's stories, and to collaborate with us in writing of what is happening.
This means collectively weaving and reweaving available narratives into each
other until the process reflects the manifold stakes claimed by its participants
and allows the process to continue without precipitous need for a definite
conclusion.
Active involvement in the collaborative rearticulation of ongoing .sodal
processes is probably also the best assurance that ournarratives remain viable
within the very constituency of our choosing and that our role as narrator .
remains acceptable to that constituency. T believe all human beings are endowed with this fundamentally social ability. An example is how politicians
in a democracy manage to preserve their role as such: It involves the ability
to narrate compelling stories that rearticulate· and braid the stories of their
constituents in ways that these constituents could accept as their own: It
surfaces in the ability bf setting agendas,of involving political bystanders in
one's project, of encouraging everyone to voice their concerns-while preserving the possibility for the process to continue, even in some other form.
Ecological narratives, too, should engage their readers in just such a process.
Hopefully, readers' responses invite us-the writers-back into the kind of
involvement we find challenging. This second kind of understanding is thus
not propositional but all too evidently dialogical.
The criterion for the first way of understanding is that our narratives can
reenter the social processes that they· narrate. This means that they must be
understandable and reproducible by their constituents and hence respectful
of them. The criterion for the second way of understanding is that; upon
reentry) these narratives can contribute to the social lift of those that they
narrate, enabling the latter to direct the social phenomena being narrated
without becoming an embarrassment to us) as ecological narrators.
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To say that ecological narratives can, were it in principle, reenter and
inform the processes they narrate isrtot to suggest that they require consensuS'''or need to satisfY everybody. On the contrary; the inevitable inconsistencie~ among stories within ecological narratives (see fifth point) and the
suggestion that all meanings be ascertainable mainly through their consequences (see third point) are unlikely to please everyone equally or always.
Since ecological narratives typically provide larger contexts for their individ- ,
ual contributors' stories, they typically recontextualize and display the propensity to challenge and even provoke existing conceptions and practices.
This can prove uncomfortable to some though 'liberating to others; And
therein lies a clear invitation for critical scholars to question constructions
of reality that are deemed suspect and to alter the conditions that give rise'
to them:-not from the position ofa godlike judge, nor in the voice of
omniscient spectators/interpreters/experts, but as since~e participants who
not only treat all of their narrated others, and especially those that critical
scholars need to challenge, with due respect but who also actjn the knowledge of being held accountable for their critiques. Ecological narrators' sin,cerity'sp;tres embarrassment, attracts respect, prolongs their activity.

EXAMPLES
., Pt'thaps an example would be, useful here-not of a coniplete ecological
narrative that would exceed the scope of this chapter but of a stOlY familiar
enough to be merely referred to: the 1993 human tragedy in Waco; Texa~.
The narratives that defined that sequence of events have ancient roots. The,
term'tragedy, since then commonly used in describing the event, ties this,
story to a classical dramaturgical form of Hellenic origin. The apocalyptic
discourse of the Davidians has been identified as the ideology of an embattled minority. It goes back to early Christian experience of Roman persecutioil-as reflected in the Book of the Apocalypse (or Revelation) by St.
John.Butthese narratives acquired new realities in the voices ofpe®ple;iliat .."
,found each other at real discursive moments. '
As the :tragedy unfolded, numerous narrators could be heard reporting ,
what they saw and responding to what they heard others say. Reporters were,
eagerto interview participants, todramatize their stories. And Without their
involvement, we might never have heard of the event. Agents of an antiterrorist (U.S. Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms-ATF) force, later
joined by Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) personnd, were s'¢tto arrest
a criminal and eager to speak of how difficult that mission was proving to
be. The U.S. attorney general, trying to assure that theaction~ talcen were
demonstrably legal and politically correct, added yet another voice. Then
there was David Koresh and his fellow Branch Davidians who, having modeled themselves according to their readings of religious texts,sought to live
their way of faith, best achievable within the bounds of a fenced compound. "
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At any one moment, most of the players spoke of themselves, of those they
saw themselves as facing, and of why they responded to each other in the
ways they did. Commentators, scholars of religion, sociopsychological expertS, and militant rightists also entered the public discourse. Even the voice
of God was roped into the process, speaking to Koresh through the latter's
reading of the Old Testament. Each of these narratives brought forth dif- .
,..•ferent-.wDrlds,with little, if anything, in common·,except that they could not
'easily ignore each other. It was these differences that set the stage for the
events that would unfold with a most terrifying determinism.
The Davidians iriside the compound had constructed a world premised
on the coming of either a golden age or a fiery end to their universe. They.
saw unquestionable "signs" for the latter. Koresh, as the Lamb of Revelation, worked hard at opening The Seven Seals, which would enable him to
'~;foiesee what would happen. The world of the government agents outside
the compound became determined by the pursuit of a strategy that had
most recently proved effective during another siege at Ruby Ridge. It was
designed to confine the movement of identified criminals and to force them
to choose between surrender or violent death. Perhaps unwittingly, the Davidiatisreinforced the ATF/FBI's conception oithe situation as a military
siege by using firearms agaillst a forceful intnision into their compound. For
the ATF/FBI, David Koresh became an armed criminal; for the public, he
became the charismatic leader of an obscure, hence potentially dangerous,
cult and a psychopath. These perceptions gave those outside the compound
nb reason. to take Koresh's words' seriOUSly. Religious scholars surfaced in
the mass media, interpreting Koresh's teachings, warning that his story an- .
ticipated someone to play the role of the evil forces that would boog about
the end of the world by a disastrous inferno, an apocalypse~a role that the
FBI would soon play, unknowingly. These experts advised the FBI about
the role it occupied in Koresh's miridand tried to engage Koresh in dialogp.esaimed at dissuading him from his course of action. From what we
know, these efforts failed to enter the narratives of either party.
. The ATF/FBI, seemingly unable to take seriously Koresh's different rationality,continued to dismiss him as an armed psychopith. They stuck to .
their military narrative and continued their siege, adding psychological warfare techniques-beaming bright light and broadcasting loud music and
messages toward the compound~with the intent to weaken the resolve of
the besieged. Seeing themselves SUrrounded by ','noisy forces of evil" and
becoming increasingly suspicious of these unknown mediators, Koresh and
his group became less and less inclined to consent to the kind of conver" .
sanons suggested. For all sides, time became of the essence, albeit in diverging directions. Koresh . sought to buy time before surrendering,
ostensibly to finish writing a. treatise he was inspired to leave behind. The
ATF/FBI, under increasing public criticism for their lingering operation,
sought instead to shorten the siege-:-by force if necessary-and added
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equipment to this effect~ Thus, a world
military strategy, weapons, and
"logistics, driven by ~e public demand for quick and decisive action, interacted with an equally closed if differently oriented world in which the Davidians not only foresaw their own fate but accepted it as such. The proofof
the validity of their stOlY came to them with the inferno that would end the.
siege.
. '
Increasingly evident ,to those of us less attached and therefore able more
carefully to see how these narratives responded to each other is that these
narratives differed in content while neatly complementing each other .in the
behavioral responses, which they entailed. As the tragedy unfolded, the dialogical space narrowed to a single path, eventually leading to the very end
fuatKoresh had prophesied· but also to. the ultimate solution that the ATF/
FBI had considered. Each side had maintained a frightful consistency within .
its oWn wofldview. The death of80 people, killed in the fire that consumed'
the compound, terminated their voices. In the course of telling and retelling
these narratives, there emerged a single story with a dramatic ending and a
place name ofreference.A1though this nowneatly bracketed story no longer
.. commemorates the-logic of the less fortunate others, varied versions continue to travel below the surface. As militia movements in the United States
and the Oldahoma City bombing would indicate, these narratives are still
'.. aqkt9 reproduce th~mselves into incidentS that, although separated by time
and geography, hang together by the stories that continue to fuel them..
I could have chosen other examples, the recent events in the former Yugoslavia, for instance. In this case, too, grand political theorizing proved
quite powerless when compared to the efforts of bringing into interaction'
the stories that people told each other and of each other. These stories
rearticulated historical events (ofTurks Invading the Balkans, of local heroes
challenging the Austrian empire into World War I, of atrocities by Nazi
collaborators in World War II) that sufficient numbers ofpeople could relate
to, that politicians could use to reconstruct present episodes as though they'
werehistoricaicontinuities, that aurriv'()'cai'mass media system could com. pellingly dramatize and widely disseminate under immunity from competing
. versions with the help of the government in Belgrade. The resulting ethnic
war arose ,entirely from within these stories. It is best understood in terms
of where it took place, whieh stories came to be retold and enacted, and
how the multiplicity of individual behaviors unfolded into unspeakable eth~
nie atrocities that we read ofbut can hardly imagine. These stories withstood
the new names, places, means of delivery, and narrators. and went on to
recreate. the network' of much earlier~ if not less heinous, interactions. .
.'
I could have exemplified ecological narratives also by way of therapeutic .
conversations. Published psychoanalytic theory notwithstanding, therapeutic
discourse is largely shielded from public scrutiny. The stories that patients
bring into a session are all that therapists have available to begin the intervention. Initially, the narrators are the actors in their own stories. Soon,
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however, the therapists have to enter these narratives, albeit by different
paths and in different roles as well. The patients' stories areas real to them
as any reality can ever be, The therapists' intervention consists of conversing
with their patients in ways that would enable the latter to rearticulate their
stories into more livable ones-lintil they feel competent to continue narrating their lives on their own, not only to themselves but, more important,
"'in:coHllboration with eithers.
".-"

CONCLUDING REMARKS
Each of these examples accounts for social situations that while vastly
different from each other are driven largely by the stories that their partic''iparits'bring to them and enact in view of each other. We theorists, too, ,
participate in social processes as narrators, regardless of where our topics
may come from. No sooner than we abandon the God's eye view of social
theorists and adopt an ecological perspective, do we come to realize that in
the social process that we are narrating all participants are competent conceptualizers, narrators, and even "theorists" of their iJwn local worlds-and,
as such, quite capable of offering situationally adequate accounts of the reasons for their actions. We are all alike in this respect, except that our commitments to narrate ecologically as scholars and theory builders encourage
us to acknowledge the possibility of diverse worlds, to attribute .them- to
those Who narrate them into being, and not least, to accept professional
responsibilities for our own narratives.'
,"
Narratives always leave much unsaid. Narrating unattended dimensions in
the lives ofothers seems easy enough, especially in the absence ofinteraction
with them. But unlike theorists-whether experimental psychologists or observers of hegemony-no ecological narrator may claim the authority to
speal<: for others without thelatters' permission. Narrating what others do
not (yet) understand should amount to no more than an invitation to dialogue, without attempts to purport one's superior abilities.
Ecological narratives can expand the understanding of their participa.nts·
continually by including the narratives of each within the ,context of all
others. This expansion requires access to as many narratives as is practical. '
Above all,it depends on a participant's openness to expand one's horizon.
Superior postures and perspectives, completeness, accuracy, and finality are
anathe~a in ecological narratives.
Ecological narratives attempt to account for ongoing social phenomena
in terms of all participants' understanding. As such, they can provide early
warnings in the most demanding contexts. The tragedy at Waco demonstrated' that accounts of unfoldings that fail to embrace the, narratives of
their constituents,' at least of the leading players, are ultimately selfdestructive. In former Yugoslavia, the principal actors enacted their own
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single-minded accounts of whom they "knew" they faced and created ruin
"
All social processes, I would argue, are self-directing, arid even autopoietic, while being mediated by the stories that their constituents revive,
telleach other, co-enact, and even live by. Placing these stories in ecologicil
interaction is one way for us to make the dynamics of the ongoing social
processes analyzable. Encouraging ecological narratives to reenter the processes that we claim to narrate assures us of their autonomous viabilityexcept where distinctions between my superior and objective accounts and "
their inferior and subjective stories enter that process (see Holsti's chapter,
this volume). Where such distinctions come to domimite any discourse, they
- carr "e-a.-sily destroy its ecological nature by erasing the very ground on which
human commuhications can take place. This self-destruction is analogous to
the one that Gregory Bateson (1972) observed in his Steps to an Ecology oj
Mind. Bateson had searched for ways to overcome the Cartesiari' construc~
tionbfrriind as the master over matter-the cherished ideal of transforming
nature in the service of exclusively human self-interests and the reliariceon
vaJidity':and on instrumental criteria for human communication.
'
We cannot prevent social theories from reentering and, yes; transforming
their domain of observation. 0 bservations involve both the theorists and
. the. the.orized in a recursion. Ecological forms, of narrating are ways of accounting for social phenomena collaboratively, without' the self-serving presumption of superior abilities to theorize others. Privileging a single
description as accurate is one mahifestation of a claim to superiority in that
a priori it disregards the voice of others and the content of their readings.
In therapy, historical accUracy comes second to getting the lives of troubled.
patients on a better track. Meaning does not reside in references to external
facts, but in the viability'of continued narration. The possibility for our narrativesto reenter the social processes that they address provides not only a
fortuitous test oftheir viability but also a benefit to all involved: It honors
all of its hnman constituents' understanding, it conserves the diversity of
their perspectives; it assures the continuation of the process of narrating
social reality, and it reserves a space for our participation.
Ecological narratives could have therapeutic effects bna social scale. To
be sure, the terrible stories that resurfaced in the former Yugoslavia lay in
waiting for a long tirrie. However, had the mass media retold these stories
in ways 'remotely resembling our ecological narratives, especially in Serbia,
where the press and television enjoyed an uncontested monopoly, had its
principal actors,been encouraged to appreciate the stories of the other side
as complementing theirs, and had these actors been: able to put them together and. see what their braiding had in store for them, perhaps the mind- '
less horror that resulted from unwavering pursuits of the theories that each
held of the other could have been avoided.
Perhaps a last distinction is in order here: that between narratives lived
,,~ill
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and narratives merely heard of or read. Their difference results in two very.
different kinds of understandings. For those who live their story, thdatter
is indistingl,lishable from reality. The Davidians in Texas lived their story as
much as the ATF/FBI did theirs. And the consequences of their interaction
were real for both sides. But this may not be so for the stories that we read
or hear others tell. An other's story may be heard, listened to, visualized,
empathi?:erlwith, perhaps'even retold. But whether such a story comes to
be lived and enacted by its listener is another matter. A major problem of
therapy is that it is always easier to listen to advice and to rearticulate what
was said than to live an earlier-heard narrative. Hence, ecological narrators,
too, can live only their own part of the story, which they narrate: Heard
stories never have the reality of lived ones. Social scientists who do research
on records (data) from a past without a present are concerned with stories
heard. They are free to adopt any criterion for those of their articulations
·welComed by their community-consistency with certain privileged stories,
or novelty, for example. This might be all that historians can do. Justifiably
perhaps, this also is the situation that invites theorizing. However, as long
as the social processes of interest remain observable and retain constitUents
whocouldteil their stories and coniment on ours, we as social scientists
·should feel obligated to reinsert our narratives into these processes, lest their
. viability in the lives of others remain an open issue.'
.
!'o abandon our comfortable role as social theorists with well-honed observational abilities, and to acknowledge that our stal<e' in any social reality
that weconstmct is always only one of many, could be viewed as an act of
courage. However, because this would also rerider olir inquiries into our
social worlds socially responsive and permit us to see each other as the political actors we have always been, it woUld also constitute an act of candor.
Reclaiming the respect for the otherness of others, which theorizingsys·tematicaUyundermines, has become of pressing importance. Ecological narrativescould help us achieve this commonly preferred mode of being and
becoming..
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